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For policymakers, the idea of active choosing has a great deal of appeal, not 
least because it avoids the charge of paternalism. In many contexts, however, 
an insistence on active choosing is a form of paternalism, not an alternative to 
it. The reason is that people might choose not to choose. People are often 
aware that when the area is complex, difficult, and unfamiliar, active choosing 
may impose high costs on choosers, who might ultimately err and thus suffer 
serious  harm. In such cases, there is a strong argument for a default rule 
rather  than  for  active  choosing.  But  if  the  area  is  one  that  choosers 
understand well, if people’s situations are diverse, and if policymakers lack the 
information that would enable them to devise accurate defaults, then active 
choosing would be best. A simple framework, based on the costs of decisions 
and the costs of errors, can provide solutions in a wide range of situations in 
which policymakers are deciding between active choosing and default rules. 
 
 
I.  A Pervasive Question 
 
Consider the following problems: 
 
1.  Public officials are deciding whether to require people, as a condition for 
obtaining  a  driver’s  license,  to  make  an  active  choice  about  whether  to 
become organ donors. The alternatives are to continue with the existing “opt 
in” system, in which people become organ donors only if they affirmatively 
indicate their consent, or to change to an “opt out” system, in which consent 
is presumed. 
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2.  A public university is deciding among three options: to enroll people 
automatically in a health insurance plan; to make them opt in if they like; or 
to say that as a condition for starting work, they must indicate whether they 
want health insurance, and if so, which plan they want. 
 
3.  A utility company is deciding whether to adopt for consumers a “green 
default,” with a somewhat more expensive but environmentally preferable 
energy source, or instead a “gray default,” with a somewhat less expensive 
but environmentally less desirable energy source, or alternatively to ask 
consumers which energy source they prefer. Its decision will be subject to 
regulatory oversight. 
 
4.  A social network site is deciding whether to adopt a system of default 
settings for privacy, or whether to require first-time users to say, as a 
condition for access to the site, what privacy settings they would prefer. 
Public officials are interested in the site’s decision and are considering a 
regulatory intervention if the decision does not serve the interests of the 
site’s users. 
 
In these cases, and countless others, policymakers are deciding whether to use or to 
promote some kind of default rule, or instead to require or to promote some kind of 
active choice. A great deal of research has shown that for identifiable reasons, default 
rules have significant effects on outcomes, because they tend to “stick.”
1 For those who 
reject paternalism and who prize freedom of choice, active choosing has evident appeal. 
Indeed it might seem far preferable to any kind of default rule. 
 
My goal here is to defend two claims. The first is that in many contexts, an 
insistence on active choosing is a form of paternalism, not an alternative to it. The 
reason is that people often choose not to choose, and for excellent reasons.  
 
The second claim is that when policymakers decide between active choosing and a 
default rule, they should focus on two factors. The first is the costs of decisions: If 
active choosing is required, are people forced to incur large costs or instead small ones? 
The second is the costs of errors: Would the number and magnitude of mistakes – from 
the standpoint of informed choosers themselves – be higher, or lower, with active 
choosing than with default rules?  
 
These questions lead to some simple rules of thumb. When the area is complex, 
technical, and unfamiliar, active choosing may impose high costs on choosers, and they 
might ultimately err. In such cases, there is a strong argument for a default rule rather 
than for active choosing. But if the area is one that choosers understand well, if the 
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situations of choosers are diverse, and if policymakers lack the information that would 
enable them to devise accurate defaults, then active choosing would be best. This 
framework can help orient a wide range of policy questions, though a great deal of 
empirical work would be desirable to understand how it applies in different contexts. In 
the future, it will be especially important for private and public institutions to consider 
the feasibility of personalized default rules, tailored to particular groups or people, and 
to explore whether personalization can avoid the problems associated with both active 
choosing and “mass” defaults. 
 
 
II. Active Choosing Can Be Paternalistic 
 
With the help of modern technologies, policymakers are in an unprecedented 
position to ask people this question: What do you choose? Whether the issue involves 
organ donation, health insurance, retirement plans, energy, privacy, or nearly anything 
else, it is simple to pose that question (and in fact to do so repeatedly and in real time, 
thus allowing people to signal new tastes and values). Those who reject paternalism, 
and want to allow people to do their own way, tend to favor active choosing. Indeed, 
there is empirical evidence that in some contexts, ordinary people will pay a premium 
to have the authority to choose on their own.
2 But in other cases, people will plainly pay 
a premium to be relieved of that very obligation. 
 
Sometimes people explicitly choose not to choose. Sometimes it is reasonable to 
infer that in particular contexts, their preference would be not to choose. They might 
fear that they will err. They might not enjoy choosing. They might be busy and lack 
“bandwidth.”
3 They might not want to take responsibility for potentially bad outcomes 
for themselves (and at least indirectly for others).
4 They might find the underlying 
questions confusing, difficult, painful, and troublesome -- empirically, morally, or 
otherwise. They might anticipate their own regret and seek to avoid it. They might be 
keenly aware of their own lack of information or perhaps even of their own behavioral 
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biases (such as unrealistic optimism or “present bias,” understood as an undue focus on 
the short-term). In the area of retirement savings or health insurance, informed 
employees might welcome a default, at least if those who choose who can be trusted. 
 
It is true that default rules tend to stick. Because people suffer from inertia (and 
thus seek to reduce “effort costs”), because default rules contain information about 
what outcomes are best or most sensible, and because people do not suffer losses 
(which default rules help to define), an opt-in design will produce far less participation 
than an opt-out design.
5 It is well-established that social outcomes might be decisively 
influenced by the choice of default, in areas that include organ donation, retirement 
savings, environmental protection, and privacy. Especially if they are averse to any kind 
of paternalism, policymakers might want to avoid the influence of default rules and to 
require active choosing instead.
6  
 
But active choosing does not avoid paternalism. Whenever policymakers promote 
active choosing on the ground that it is good for people to choose, they are acting 
paternalistically. To be sure, nanny states forbid choosing, but they also forbid the 
choice not to choose. Choice-requiring paternalism might be an attractive form of 
paternalism, but it is no oxymoron, and it is paternalistic nonetheless.  
 
Suppose, for example, that Jones believes that he is not likely to make a good choice 
about his retirement plan, and that he would therefore prefer a default rule, chosen by 
someone who is a specialist in the subject at hand. Or suppose that Smith is exceedingly 
busy, and wants to focus on her most important or immediate concerns, not on a question 
about the right health insurance plan for her, or even about the right privacy setting on her 
computer. Many people believe in freedom of choice on social welfare grounds; they 
believe that people are uniquely situated to know what is best for them. If so, then that 
very argument should support respect for people when they freely choose not to choose. 
Many people believe in freedom of choice on the ground that it is important to respect 
people’s autonomy. If so, then it is also important to respect people’s decisions about 
whether and when to choose. That view seems especially reasonable in view of the fact 
that people are in a position to make countless decisions, and they might well decide that 
they would like to exercise their autonomy by focusing on their foremost concerns, not 
on what seems trivial, boring, or difficult.  
 
If people are required to choose even when they would prefer not to do so, active 
choosing counts as a species of nonlibertarian paternalism in the sense that people’s 
own choice is being rejected. When people prefer not to choose, required choosing is a 
form of coercion. If, by contrast, people are asked whether they want to choose, and can 
opt out of active choosing (in favor of, say, a default rule), active choosing counts as a 
form of libertarian paternalism. In some cases, it is an especially attractive form. A 
private or public institution might ask people whether they want to choose the privacy 
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settings on their computer, or instead rely on the default, or whether they want to 
choose their electricity supplier, or instead rely on the default.  
 
With such an approach, people are being asked to make an active choice between 
the default and their own preference, and in that sense, their liberty is fully preserved. 
Call this simplified active choosing. Simplified active choosing has the advantage of 
avoiding the kinds of pressure that come from a default rule, while also allowing people 
to rely on such a rule if they like. This approach has evident appeal, and in the future, it 
is likely to prove attractive to a large number of institutions, both public and private. 
 
To be sure, we could imagine hard cases in which a choice not to choose seems to be 
an  alienation  of  freedom.  In  the  extreme  case,  people  might  choose  to  be  slaves  or 
otherwise to relinquish their liberty in some fundamental way (consider marital choice, or 
freedom of speech or religion). It is a complex question which cases fall in this category. 
But even if the category is not small, it cannot easily to taken as a general objection to 
the proposition that on grounds of welfare and autonomy, people should be allowed not to 
choose. 
 
It  is  important  to  acknowledge  that  the  choice  not  to  choose  may  not  be  in  the 
chooser’s interest (as the chooser would define it). Perhaps the chooser chooses not to 
choose only because he lacks important information (which would reveal that the default 
rule might be harmful) or suffers from some form of bounded rationality. Perhaps the 
chooser is myopic and is excessively influenced by the short-term costs of choosing, 
which might require some learning (and hence some investment), while underestimating 
the long-term benefits, which might be very large. A form of “present bias” might infect 
the decision not to choose.  
 
But  for  those  who  reject  paternalism,  these  kinds  of  concerns  are  usually  a 
justification for providing more and better information or for some kind of nudge – not 
for blocking people’s choices, including their choices not to choose. In light of people’s 
tendency to overconfidence, the choice not to choose might even be peculiarly likely to 
be right, which would create serious problems for choice-requiring paternalism. Consider 
in  this  regard  behavioral  evidence  that  people  spend  too  much  time  trying  to  make 
precisely the right choice, in a way that leads to significant welfare losses. In many 
situations,  people  underestimate  the  temporal  costs  of  choosing  and  exaggerate  the 
benefits, producing “systematic mistakes in predicting the effect of having more, vs. less, 
choice freedom on task performance and task-induced affect.”
7  
 
If people prefer not to choose, they might favor either an opt-in or opt-out design. 
In the context of both retirement plans and health insurance, for example, many people 
prefer opt-out, on the ground that automatic enrollment overcomes inertia and 
procrastination, and produces sensible outcomes for most employees. Indeed, the 
Affordable Care Act requires automatic enrollment by large employers, starting in 
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2015. For benefits programs that are either required by law or generally in people’s 
interests, automatic enrollment has considerable appeal. 
 
In the context of organ donation, by contrast, many people prefer an opt-in design. 
In that context, of course, there is a strong argument for active choosing, on the ground 
that as compared to opt-in, it would save lives, and could also avoid some of the moral 
objections that might be mounted against opt-out. But as the experience in several 
states suggests, some people object to active choosing, and favor opt-in, on the ground 
that they do not want to be forced to make the choice. In view of the life-saving 
potential of active choosing, that objection may not be convincing, but it is at least 
intelligible.  
 
Are people genuinely bothered by the existence of default rules, or would they be 
bothered if they were made aware that such rules had been chosen for them? We do not 
have a full answer to this question; the setting, and the level of trust, undoubtedly matter. 
But note in this regard the empirical finding, in the context of end-of-life care, that even 
when they are explicitly informed that a default rule is in place, and that it has been 
chosen because it affects people’s decisions, there is essentially no effect on what people 
do – a finding that suggests that people are not uncomfortable with defaults, even when  
they are made aware that choice architects have selected them, and do so because of their 
significant effect.
8 More research would be highly desirable on this question. 
 
III. Decision Costs and Error Costs 
 
The choice between active choosing and default rules cannot be made in the abstract. 
To  know  which  is  best,  policymakers  need  to  investigate  two  factors:  the  costs  of 
decisions and the costs of errors. In some cases, active choosing imposes high costs, 
because  it  is  time-consuming  and  difficult  to  choose.  In  other  cases,  the  decision  is 
relatively easy and the associated costs are low. Sometimes people actually enjoy making 
decisions, in which case decision costs turn out to be benefits. In some cases, active 
choosing reduces the number and magnitude of errors, because choosers have far better 
information, about what would promote their welfare, than policymakers do. In other 
cases, active choosing increases the number and magnitude of errors, because choosers 
lack such information, and policymakers have a great deal of it. 
 
With these points in mind, two propositions are clear, and they can help orient the 
inquiry  in  diverse  settings.  First,  policymakers  should  prefer  default  rules  to  active 
choosing when the context is confusing and unfamiliar, when people would prefer not to 
choose, and when the population is not heterogeneous along any relevant dimension. The 
last point is especially important. Suppose that with respect to some benefit, one size fits 
all or most, in the sense that it promotes the welfare of a large percentage of the affected 
population. If so, active choosing might be unhelpful or unnecessary.  
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Second, policymakers should generally prefer active choosing to default rules when 
choice architects lack relevant information, when the context is familiar, when people 
would actually prefer to choose (and hence choosing is a benefit rather than a cost), when 
learning matters, and when there is relevant heterogeneity. Suppose, for example, that 
with respect to health insurance, people’s situations are highly diverse, so that any default 
rule  will  be  ill-suited  to  most  or  many.  If  so,  there  is  a  strong  argument  for  active 
choosing.  
 
To be sure, the development of personalized default rules, designed to fit individual 
circumstances,  might  solve  or  reduce  the  problems  posed  by  heterogeneity.
9 As  data 
accumulates  about  what  informed  people  choose,  or  even  about  what  particular 
individuals choose, it will become more feasible to devise default rules that fit diverse 
situations. With retirement plans, for example, demographic information is now used to 
produce  different  initial  allocations,  and  travel  websites  are  able  to  incorporate 
information  about  past  choices  to  select  personalized  defaults  (and  also  advice).  For 
policymakers, the rise of personalization promises to reduce the costs of “mass” defaults 
and  to  reduce  the  need  for  active  choosing,  though  personalization  can  raise  serious 
questions about both feasibility and privacy. 
 
There is a final point, which is that active choosing has the advantage of promoting 
learning  and  thus  the  development  of  preferences  and  values.  In  some  cases, 
policymakers might know that a certain outcome is in the interest of most people, but 
they might also believe that it is independently important for people to learn about the 
underlying questions, so that they can use the “stock” of what they learn to make choices 
in  multiple  areas  in  the  future.  In  the  context  of  decisions  that  involve  health  and 
retirement, it may be valuable for people to develop the kinds of understandings that will 
enable them to choose well for themselves. Those who favor active choosing tend to 
emphasize this point and to see it as a powerful objection to the use of default rules. They 
might be right, but the context greatly matters. People’s time and attention are limited, 
and the question is whether it makes a great deal of sense to force them to develop a 




In many contexts, the apparent opposition between active choosing and paternalism 
is illusory, even a logical error. The reason is that some people choose not to choose, or 
would do so if they were asked. Nanny states forbid people from choosing, but they also 
forbid people from choosing not to choose.  If policymakers are overriding that particular 
choice, they may well be acting paternalistically.  
 
We have also seen that the argument for active choosing, or instead for some kind of 
default rule, depends largely on the costs of decisions and the costs of errors. Where 
people  are  relevantly  heterogeneous,  and  where  choice  architects  lack  information  or 
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neutrality, active choosing has real advantages. But if the area is highly technical and if a 
default rule is accurate, a requirement of active choosing is unlikely to make a great deal 
of sense. When choice architects overlook this point and nonetheless insist on active 
choosing, they might well be behaving paternalistically, and in a way that reduces both 
the welfare and the autonomy of those whom they are seeking to help. In such cases, 
choice-requiring paternalism should be avoided.  
 
 